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Creating Competitive Advantage in the Global Marketplace: 





Dynamic changes in the competitive global arena and constraints from the lack of natural resources to 
meet these changes have led Singapore to look beyond its borders to create an external economy.  A 
failed  internationalisation  initiative  in  the  early  1990s  led  Singapore  to  shift  the  emphasis  to 
regionalization. The focus of this paper is on Singapore’s strategic initiative to create the economic space 
for local and Singapore-based multinationals to expand regionally, centred on a number of industrial 
township  developments  in  China,  Vietnam  and  Indonesia.  The  basis  for  the  townships  has  been  to 
transplant Singapore’s successful industrial township model into the region, enabling a `strategic blend’ 
of Singapore’s capital and reputation for sound industrial infrastructure with the abundant resources of 
host  countries.  These,  along  with  Singapore’s  efficient  infrastructure  and  stable,  corrupt-free 
administration, and ‘guanxi’ (or connections) with regional governments, were believe to provide the 
projects with a competitive edge in the global marketplace. This paper finds the attempts to replicate the 
Singapore-styled townships in East Asia have met with only limited success. 
 
Key words: Regionalization - Industrial Parks - Singapore - East Asia   2
INTRODUCTION 
 
The outward orientation of East Asian economies, in the 1980s and early 1990s, presented Singapore with 
a  unique  opportunity  to  develop  its  external  economy,  popularly  termed  as  the  `second  wing’.  A 
regionalization program was launched in the early 1990s, with the strategic intent of creating economic 
space  for  local  and  Singapore-based  multinationals  to  redistribute  their  operations  regionally.    This 
would, in turn, allow the restructuring of the domestic economy to higher value activities which require 
Singapore’s unique set  of  competencies,  and  also make  room  for the development  of  new  economy 
industries to allow the city-state to remain competitive in the global marketplace. By taking a transborder 
development approach, regional sites were able to focus on each party’s core competencies and leverage 
on each others’ resources, technology and markets.  This form of synergy which has been referred to as 
`shakkei’1,  or  collective  competitiveness,  augments  the  development  of  regional  economies  and 
Singapore, allowing all partners to borrow strengths in a complementary manner (Singapore Economic 
Development Board,  1993, 1995a, 1995b). 
 
The strategic thrust of the regionalization program involved the establishment of industrial townships in 
the region  to  create  a  `Singapore-styled’  business  environment  in  emerging  economies  for local  and 
Singapore-based MNCs (Perry and Yeoh, 2000). More specifically, in order to replicate Singapore’s 
success story, the local government takes a proactive approach by identifying potential sites to develop in 
the region.  By developing these sites, the government aimed to use them as a launch pad into the 
domestic markets, and also as an access to the abundant resources.  This would present Singapore with 
strategic  linkages  to  the  region,  which  enables  Singapore-based  companies  to  redistribute  resource-
intensive  activities  while  maintaining  a  high-value  presence  in  Singapore  as  a  regional  headquarters 
distinguishing itself through its competitive advantages as a high-value investment site.  The Singapore 
                                                            
1 `Shakkei’ is a Japanese landscaping strategy derived from traditional Chinese garden design. With `Shakkei’, the 
scenery from one’s garden is enhanced by incorporating the scenery from afar, such that the combined scenery is 
superior to each on its own.    3
government  also  takes  on  the  role  of  a  `business  architect’  and  `knowledge  arbitrageur’  (Economic 
Development  Board,  1995:42),  by  matchmaking  the  private  sector  and  Singapore’s  public  sector  to 
undertake large-scale investments in the region as exemplified by its existing regional industrial parks. 
 
The paper examines Singapore’s advanced industrial-township projects in Indonesia, China and Vietnam. 
The paper begins with a background on Singapore’s regionalization program, followed by a stock-take of 
the  flagship  industrial  parks  projects.  These  flagship  projects  will  be  evaluated  on  their  success  in 
attracting investments and their ability to contribute to Singapore’s strategic objectives at a micro and 
macro level.  Finally the paper considers the lessons learned, and how Singapore has moved on from the 
experience. 
 
THE SINGAPORE `SUCCESS STORY’ DIFFUSED THROUGH REGIONALIZATION 
 
Singapore has always pursued an outward looking policy and realised the importance of being actively 
linked  with  the  global  economy  due  to  Singapore’s  lack  of  naturally  endowed  resources  and  the 
government realisation that in order for Singapore to remain competitive, it must constantly upgrade itself 
to keep with changes in the global arena and to leverage global resources to stimulate further growth.  The 
importance of being plugged into the global economy was heightened by the mid-1980s recession.  In 
1989, the Strategic Economic Plan prescribed strengthening the domestic economy and also brought 
attention  to  developing  a  strong  external  economy  through  new  initiatives  to  promote  outward 
investments in the region and beyond.  The first response was a largely unsuccessful attempt to accelerate 
international business linkages (Caplen and Ng, 1990). The program was designed to accelerate access to 
overseas markets, mainly in North America and Europe, but it proved ineffective (Balakrishnan, 1990; 
Kanai, 1993), thus prompting the government to scale down its external economy building plans and look   4
towards the region.  This change2 in strategy to regionalization was rationalised by the liberalisation of 
foreign investment controls occurring at the time in countries like Indonesia, China and Vietnam, and the 
subsequent high growth rates they were achieving (Perry, 1995; Kraar, 1996; Kwok, 1996). Private sector 
reluctance  in  regionalising  was  the  Government’s  raison  d`etat3  that  Singapore’s  government  linked 
companies (GLCs) should lead the regionalization drive.  
 
The regionalization strategy comprised state-led infrastructure projects and a range of incentives and 
regulatory  innovations  designed  to  assist  private  companies  and  individuals  move  overseas4.  The 
government took a threefold approach in its township developments.  It began with senior politicians5 
negotiating  with  the  host  governments  to  establish  a  favourable  institutional  framework  through 
concessions and endorsement for facilitating the townships.  The second step involved GLCs investing 
heavily into the infrastructure and real estate development of townships to lend their reputation to the 
projects so as to attract private investors. The final step is the heavy promotions of the townships to 
Singapore-based companies and also MNCs looking to invest in the region6. The Singapore Economic 
Development  Board  (SEDB)  encouraged  MNCs  to  locate  their  regional  support  and  headquarters  in 
Singapore while setting up low value and resource intensive activities in the townships.  
 
                                                            
2 The change was endorsed by the Committee to Promote Enterprise Overseas (Singapore Ministry of Finance, 
1993). 
3 The political economy of Singapore’s industrialization program has been extensively discussed in Rodan (1989), 
Regnier  (1991)  and  Huff  (1995).  There  is  also  an  extensive  political-geography  literature  on  Singapore’s 
regionalization program, succinctly summarized in Yeung (1998). 
4 A summary of the regionalization incentive schemes may be gleaned from the Singapore Economic Development 
Board, Singapore Investment News, Regionalization Supplement, May 1993. 
5 The stress on exploiting personal ties accords  with business practice preferred by the linked communities of 
`overseas Chinese’,(Redding, 1995, Yeung, 1997, Brown, 1998; Lehmann, 1998), the `bamboo’ network which 
Singapore made use of in its industrial parks in Indonesia and China.  
 
6Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee emphasised this: “Companies can reduce their risks when venturing into Asia by 
linking up with local partners, and Singapore can help facilitate this process by acting as a `Partnership Centre” to 
bring together strategic alliances for companies to invest in third countries in the East Asia region. … [We] can 
provide foreign companies with a convenient foothold through the industrial parks that are being built and managed 
by Singapore in China, India, Indonesia and Vietnam.” (Quoted in Asian Review, 1996, p.VII).   5
THE INDONESIAN PARKS 
 
The parks on the neighboring Riau islands of Batam and Bintan, located 50 km southeast of Singapore, 
were  the  first  of  Singapore’s  overseas  industrial  parks.    Batamindo  Industrial  Park  (BIP)  was  the 
successful prototype opened in 1992 with Bintan Industrial Estate (BIE) following in 1994. The design of 
the parks is largely the same, based on the concept of being self-sufficient.  Both parks include their own 
power  supply,  water  supply  and  treatment,  telecommunications,  commercial  services  and  hostels  for 
workers, including an executive village to provide accommodation and recreation for professional staff.  
BIE  also  has  its  own  port  with  direct  ferry  connection  to  Singapore.    The  Indonesian  parks  were 
established as a joint-venture between Singapore GLCs7 and the Salim Group of Indonesia. Salim was 
then Indonesia’s largest business conglomerates with close links to senior politicians, and privileged 
access  to  major  investment  projects  in  the  Riau  island  (Hill,  1996).  The  GLCs  were  in-charge  of 
developing  and  managing  the  Parks,  while  Salim  facilitated  operations  and  provided  a  guarantee  of 
priority in the respect of regulatory controls and administrative approvals.  This allowed Singapore to take 
charge of the marketing, where it could leverage on its reputation for efficiency and reliability to engage 
MNCs. 
 
Aside  from  self-sufficiency,  the  Parks  provided  ready  built  factories  for  lease  which  allowed  quick 
occupation and minimal commitment. The Singapore Economic Development Board (SEDB) was active 
in encouraging leading MNCs in Singapore to use the Parks, and the MNCs clearly perceived advantages 
in showing their support for government programs as taxation concessions in Singapore are allocated on a 
case-by-case basis (Perry, 1995). 
   
                                                            
7 The Singapore consortium was led by Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation (now SembCorp Industries) 
and Jurong Town Corporation, Singapore’s main industrial estate infrastructure developer.   6
Batamindo Industrial Park 
 
Batam had been negotiated as a location for possible joint investment projects between Singapore and 
Indonesia since the Indonesian government started to promote its economic development in the 1970s. 8 
However a mutual agreement was only reached in the late 1980s when Indonesia’s offer to extend foreign 
investment  concessions  to  kick-start  Batam’s  development  met  Singapore’s  priority  for  additional 
production space (Perry, 1991; Yeoh et al., 1991). The concessions included lifting of foreign ownership 
requirements, the amendment of Batam’s duty free status to facilitate a proportion of outputs for export to 
the rest of Indonesia and allowance for foreign companies to manage industrial estates which provided 
Singapore GLCs with lowered investment risks leading to an opportunity to set up the joint venture to 
develop and manage BIP.  
 
Seven other industrial estates authorised by the Batam Industrial Development Authority had been set up before BIP 
which became the first to bring significant industrial activity to Batam. The first tenants arrived in 1991, mainly 
subsidiaries of American, European and Japanese multinationals already operating in Singapore (Yeoh et al., 1992). 
The industrial township has been successfully developed.  By June 2002, there were 88 companies and 66,000 
workers in the Park (Table 1), with the initial area reserved of 500 hectares being fully committed. However, 
limitations have emerged need attention:  
 
a)   The  scale  and  character  of  development  have  not  influenced  the  restructuring  of  the  Singapore 
economy nor proven to be as attractive to local companies and foreign MNCs as intended.  The park 
is  acting  more  as  a  Japanese  electronics  manufacturing  enclave,  fitting  their  needs  for  the 
                                                            
8 Singapore’s vision of the role of Batam clashed with the Indonesian ambition to create a diversified modern 
metropolis comparable to Singapore. BIP’s design reflected Singapore’s economic planners vision of Batam as a 
relocation point for low value assembly activity (Liew, 1990).  These ambitions were loured following Indonesia’s 
dismal returns on its efforts to promote Batam coupled with BIP’s promise to lever other investments under a larger 
growth triangle initiative for which it became the key flagship project (Perry, 1991; Yeoh, 1993; Peachy et al., 
1998).   
   7
development  of Japanese production  networks  in  Southeast  Asia  (Hatch  and  Yamamura,  1996), 
rather than  meeting  initial  plans  of  managing  the  outflow  of  MNC investments and  stimulating 
Singapore’s  role  as  a  regional  headquarters9.  This  makes  the  park  vulnerable  to  movements  in 
Japanese investments, and limits linkages to the Singapore economy. 
 
b)   Batam has been overwhelmed by its reputation as a boom economy, leading to a tripling of the 
population since 1990, with the new migrants living in illegal squatter houses scattered throughout the 
island (The Straits Times, October 6, 2001). Lower costs and accommodation regulations have led 
half of BIP’s labor force to reside in the squatters, which introduces tensions and social problems. 
The challenge is to maintain the investment value of BIP, without a shift of resources to meet the 
needs of the local community. 
 
c)  Competing parks10 within close proximity, and, in some instances, backed by prominent Indonesian 
politicians,  have  dampened  the  competitive  edge  of  BIP.  Some  of  the  larger  parks  are  rapidly 
developing to match BIP standards, and have eroded the premium placed on BIP’s formulaic one-stop 
service and self-sufficient operating environment. 
 
Bintan Industrial Estate 
 
BIE is the only industrial park on Bintan and the Indonesian authorities’ willingness to facilitate the BIE 
project proved to be a positive spin-off for Singapore. Singapore’s GLCs were able to secure a 4,000 
hectare coastal site for the BIE project. Duty free status, not extended to Bintan as a whole, was accorded 
to BIE. Customs, immigration, quarantine and port clearance is done through BIE’s on-site integrated 
terminal, which expedites the shipment of raw materials and finished goods. More significantly, despite 
                                                            
9 See Grundy-Warr and Perry, 1996; Peachey et al., 1998. 
10 13 other industrial parks have mushroomed, of which Panbil Industrial Park, located directly opposite BIP, poses 
the strongest threat.   8
BIE being subject to provincial administration, it was allocated staff from regulatory agencies to facilitate 
the formulaic one-stop approval process. Bintan enjoys low land prices which enables factory rents to be 
25 to 50 per cent lower than BIP. 
    
BIE was initially targeted at textiles and wood processing activities. Wood processing never took off, and 
access to Singapore's export quota under the multi-fibre agreement has since been lost leading to a change 
in marketing emphasis, with electronics added to the marketing priorities in 1997. This led to a modest 
growth in investments. BIE was downsized to a 500-hectare development, with 110 hectares developed to 
-date at a cost of US$113 million.  As at June 2002, BIE has 35 tenants and 13,000 workers (Table 1).  
 
Even  with  the  reduced  target  of  developing  a  500-hectare  township,  at  present,  the  goal  appears 
unrealistic given the slow growth in occupancy.  BIE started out ill-timed. It was launched at the same 
time as Singapore’s other flagship projects in China and Vietnam which presented investors with more 
lucrative options.  This presented BIE with a ‘chicken and egg’ dilemma as they required the economies 
of  increased  occupancy  to  improve  the  operating  environment,  yet  with  the  limited  supporting 
environment,  it  was  (and  still  is)  difficult to  attract  tenants.  At  present,  BIE  is  neither  a  significant 
contributor to the restructuring of the Singapore economy, nor a commercially viable project (Perry and 
Yeoh, 2000).  
 
Land ownership is also a major contentious issue, as the plot BIE is on was acquired by the Salim Group 
which  has  come  under  question  by  regional  legislators  and  local  farmers.  Salim  was  prosecuted  for 
alleged illegal land appropriation in February 2000, following the storming of BIE by an estimated 1000 
villagers who shut down its power generators. This led to SembCorp Industries to threaten to pull out 
their investments. The financial disputes and mob protests have introduced more uncertainties into the 
long-term viability of BIE. Ironically, these developments occurred just a month after Singapore unveiled   9
a massive assistance package for Indonesia, when the Prime Minister led a business delegation to Jakarta 
to explore investment opportunities.  
 
Looking Ahead … 
 
The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency had offered to sell the Salim Group’s stakes – an estimated 
S$500 million - in all the Riau projects (The Business Times, August 28, 2001).  Further restructuring 
leaves the three main stakeholders being SembCorp Industries, Ascendas (a JTC-linked company) and the 
Indonesian government. This is a fundamental change considering the Salim connection was a pillar of 
the  Indonesian  parks  success  given  the  facilitation  enabled  to  provide  quick  set-up  and  efficient 
administrative  process  so  that  companies  can  focus  on  the  core  competencies.  The  Parks  are  also 
adversely affected by the political developments which followed the Asian financial crisis, the September 
11  attacks,  the  Bali  bomb  blasts  and  reports  of  active  terrorist  cells  in  the  region.  New  investment 
commitments to BIP have taken a dive, and investments in BIE have trickled to a halt. 
 
Regional autonomy laws (nos. 22 and 25 of 1999), introduced by the Habibie government, have added 
longer-term uncertainties to the Parks’ operating environment. Officially implemented in 2001, foreign 
companies  (including  Singapore  GLCs)  now  have  to  deal  with  the  provincial  and  sub-provincial 
governments much more intensively than they did during the Soeharto era. Our on-site interviews11 with 
executives and tenants, in both BIP and BIE, have confirmed this new development. Preliminary evidence 
points to a more complex regulatory environment for foreign companies. 
 
 
THE CHINESE PARKS 
 
                                                            
11 Interviews in BIP and BIE were conducted in July and September 2002, respectively.   10 
The  BIP-prototype  was  adopted  in  the  physical  design  of  the  Parks  at  Suzhou  and  Wuxi.  The 
administrative environment was, however, very different. In Indonesia, the partner of choice was a well-
connected private-sector conglomerate, and the partnership was given the political patronage of senior 
politicians. China, in contrast, had a more complex administrative and regulatory environment, and the 
projects had to contend with multiple tiers of government administration, and the competition (or more 
precisely, the `fiscal politics’) between these tiers at a time of rapid economic and political changes. 
 
Singapore’s primary concern with the Indonesian investments had been to promote the restructuring of 
the Singapore economy, and exploit the complementarity of neighboring economies (Yeoh et al., 1991; 
Perry, 1991; Toh and Low, 1993; Kumar and Siddique, 1994; Peachey et al., 1998).   The Suzhou project, 
on the other hand, had an added agenda of showcasing the Singapore success model and its transferability 
to other Asian environments. The Wuxi initiative had narrower objectives, premised on the perception 
that Singapore GLCs have a competitive edge in industrial estate development in China because of their 
links to western business, and access to Chinese business and political networks. 
 
China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park 
 
At  70,000  hectares  and  an  estimated  project  cost  of  US$20  billion,  CS-SIP  was  Singapore’s  most 
ambitious  undertaking  and  also  the  most  controversial.  CS-SIP  was  also  envisioned  as  a  balanced 
township, with a population of 600,000 and a workforce of 360,000.  It was to go beyond the prototype 
industrial  park  design  (BIP)  with  commercial  centres  and  a  full  range  of  urban  facilities  for  the 
executives, employees and their families. The project was also to be the new commercial centre for 
Suzhou as well as serving the surrounding area.  Singapore intended to reflect its ability at developing the 
township both socially and economically. This grandiose goal was encouraged by China’s former premier 
Deng  Xiaoping  who, it has  been  said,  regarded  Singapore  as  ‘a  capitalist  version  of the communist   11 
dream’.  In  1992,  Deng  promoted  the  idea  of  learning  from  Singapore  as  a  way  of  avoiding  the 
environment problems and social disorder that concerned him in southern China. As Deng put it: 
“The social order in Singapore is good, they are strict. We should adapt 
their experience and do better than they do (our emphasis).”   
      -  quoted in SIPAC, 1999. 
 
Taking these remarks at face-value, Singapore’s leaders offered to bring their know-how into China, 
provided they could get a free hand to demonstrate it. The project was personally undertaken by Senior 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew who led the idea through its formative stages to its launch on May 12, 1994.   
 
CS-SIP  was  developed  through  a  joint  venture  as  the  China-Singapore  Suzhou  Industrial  Park 
Development  Company  (CSSD).  The  Chinese  consortium  had  a  35  percent  stake  in  CSSD  shared 
amongst  12  organizations,  mainly  national  state-owned  enterprises  together  with  Suzhou  city.  The 
Singapore  consortium  had  a  65  percent  stake  in  CSSD  shared  amongst  24  organizations,  mainly 
Singapore GLCs, including EDB Investment and JTC International, as well as two organizations that also 
participated in other parks - SembCorp Industries and the Salim Group (through a subsidiary, KMP China 
Investments). The two  consortia  retain  their  separate  identity,  with  projects taken  up  by  participants 
according to their expertise and agreed roles. The work of CSSD was overseen by a specially created 
local  authority,  the  Suzhou  Industrial  Park  Administrative  Committee  (SIPAC).  Inter-governmental 
interest remained through a joint ministerial council. 
 
The Singapore model, as applied to CS-SIP, encompassed high quality infrastructure, pollution control, 
‘one-stop’ non-corrupt decision-making, and minimum entry or performance regulation, and transparent 
financial charges. In order to bring these attributes to CS-SIP , a large-scale project was required to 
facilitate institutional innovation, autonomy from aspects of local government control and investment in 
administrative  practice  or,  as  it  has  become  known,  ‘software  development’  (Cartier,  1995;  SIPAC, 
1999).    12 
 
Singapore optimism over the Suzhou project was encouraged by a series of perceived advantages secured 
at  the  outset.    These  included  CS-SIP  being  a  inter-governmental  development  initiative  which  was 
believed to translate into added security against political risks of investing in China, and the township was 
also afforded preferential policies in part due to its ties and its location. CS-SIP is located in Jiangsu 
province, which was selected in the early 1990s for accelerated economic development to offset the 
concentration of foreign investment in the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) (Yang, 1997). The project and 
due  process  was  viewed  as  a  stepping  stone  for  Singapore  businesses  to  venture  into  the  rapidly 
developing China market.  
 
Limits  to  each  of  the  advantages  obtained  were  apparent  from  the  outset.  The  inter-governmental 
endorsement was derailed by the influence of provincial and municipal authorities, and their interests in 
competing projects. Incentives which were granted to SIPAC were replicated to other industrial zones. 
Moreover, a concession that allowed SIPAC to retain development revenues, led local administrators to 
favour projects generating revenue for the municipality12.  
 
The situation was aggravated by competition from the Suzhou New District (SND), an industrial zone 
open to foreign investment, which was mooted before CS-SIP and launched in 1989. SND continued to 
be favoured for commercial and housing development as well as investments by foreign investors (The 
Straits Times, May 14, 1999). The Suzhou authorities were also exploiting Singapore’s marketing efforts 
and  re-directing  investors to  SND.13  It  was  difficult  to  retain  software  advantage  within  CS-SIP  as 
practices were replicated in SND and other zones.  SND now claims to match CS-SIP’s capacity for rapid 
decision making.  
                                                            
12 For a discussion of China’s `fiscal politics’ in an era of decentralization and local autonomy, see Hsing (1998). 
13 For instance, it was reported that Suzhou’s vice-mayor, Wang Jinhua, told potential investors in Germany in 1997 
that they should invest directly in China without Singapore’s help, and that all of Jiangsu’s resources would go to 
SND, not CS-SIP (The Straits Times, January 15, 1998). For more examples of how local authorities circumvent 
rules and regulations imposed by the central government, see Hsing (1998).   13 
 
Singapore’s disappointment was indicated by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s public questioning of the 
commitment of the Chinese partners to the project14 (The Straits Times, 5 December 1997).  Profitability 
was not the most important concern as the Singapore government has staked its reputation on the project, 
thus it had to maintain the credibility of Singapore’s strength in township development and management. 
The subtle, yet crucial difference, in objectives was translated into perception differences, protracted 
conflicts and project delays. Singapore’s main gripe was the dismal progress in housing and commercial 
projects. By end-1998, there were only around 1,000 residents in the township and a total workforce of 
6,000 (SIPAC, 1998).  The slow progress resulted in financial losses for the Singapore-led consortium, 
which funded the land development and infrastructure, and also for Singaporean investors involved in 
peripheral projects.   
 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis provided a context where withdrawal become easier to justify, and in June 
1999, it was announced that Singapore would reduce its involvement in the project and transfer majority 
ownership of CSSD to the Chinese consortium from 2001 (The Straits Times, June 30, 1999). Official 
estimates stated that Singapore’s investment in CS-SIP amounted to only US$147 million (The Straits 
Times, August 4, 1999); the real (political) cost may well be the suggestion that Singapore was naive in 
perceiving that it would obtain a special status in China (The Economist, January 3, 1998). 
 
In January 2001, CS-SIP had attracted 133 projects, with more than 91 operational international firms and 
14,000 employed. Interestingly, investments began to pour in thereafter, with profits of US$7.5 million 
expected in 2001, the first time since the Park’s inception (The Straits Times, January 19, 2001). CS-
SIP’s growth continues into 2002, with contracted investments exceeding US$12 billion, and the Park has 
become a foreign investment hub linked to Fortune 500 companies.  CSSD plans to be listed by 2004, and 
                                                            
14 Critics have, however, challenged this position, suggesting that favouritism runs resoundly the CS-SIP way. It had 
political support from the Chinese President down, and had autonomy (e.g. in planning and land use) not available 
elsewhere in China..    14 
plans  are  in  the  pipeline  for  the  completion  of  the  transportation  network  and  other  infrastructure 
developments within CS-SIP. 
 
CS-SIP experienced greater development challenges than anticipated, but the high value of industrial 
investment attracted has provided a basis from which the township could grow. Its tenant profile also 
included, significantly, a high proportion of American and European investors (Table 1). This proves that 
the  Singapore  model  carried  weight15  with  investors  most  at  risk  from  administrative  uncertainties 
(SIPAC, 1999), but it is against the larger diplomatic objectives pursued by the Singapore government 
that CS-SIP will ultimately be judged. 
Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park 
 
At  an  income  of  US$2,000  per  capita,  Wuxi  is  one  of  the  wealthiest  Chinese  cities  with  an  urban 
population of 4.3 million.  WSIP started as a real estate development with the potential to cover 1000 
hectares and unlike CS-SIP, WSIP was negotiated directly with the Wuxi authorities16, and this direct 
involvement has minimized the polarization between the higher echelons of Chinese government and the 
provincial government which had plagued CS-SIP. The Singapore-led consortium took a 70 percent stake, 
with the remaining 30% held by Wuxi’s municipal government.   
 
WSIP has been designated a national high technology development zone as part of the Torch Program 
initiated in 1988.  Wuxi municipal authority has interests in other industrial estates17, which are claimed 
not to be direct competitors. The basic taxation incentives offered to foreign investors matches that of CS-
                                                            
15  The  then  Suzhou  Mayor,  Zhang  Xin  Sheng  readily  acknowledged  that  Suzhou  borrowed  Singapore’s  credibility  with 
multinationals (cited in Kraar, 1996:4). 
 
16  A  Singapore  government  source  attributes  the  difficulties  to  the  fact  that  CS-SIP  is  essentially  a  central 
government project: “Suhou is very much a Beijing-Singapore affair, so the co-operation between Singapore and the 
municipality has not been as smooth as in  Wuxi, which is a project between Singapore Technologies and the 
municipality.” 
17 For example, the One Zone-Five Parks-One College initiative.    15 
SIP.  Singapore’s EDB also played a recognised part in bringing the first tenants to WSIP, including 
Singapore-based MNCs. The total investment attracted has, however, been below that attracted to CS-
SIP18.  WSIP’s tenant profile remains largely Asian, in relatively low value-added sectors (Table 1). As 
at July 2002, employment stood at 15,000. 
 
Investor interest has slowed, with immediate prospects of growth hinging on the expansion plans of 
existing tenants. WSIP has been operating at a loss from 1998 through to 2000.  It has been developed to 
its second phase, covering 235 hectares, but has yet to achieve commercial viability. The Singapore-led 
consortium decided in mid-2002 to divest part of its holdings (from 70% to 49%)19.  Not unlike CS-SIP, 
the Chinese partner has recently announced plans to develop the third phase of the project, which will 
double the Park’s size. The Park’s performance is expected to turn around in 2002.  Interestingly, even 
though WSIP had not experienced administrative difficulties with the local bureaucracy, the handing over 
to Chinese management mirrors the outcome of CS-SIP.  
 
Suzhou and Wuxi Considered … 
 
Although  the  Parks  did  not  manage  to  achieve  economic  viability  under  Singapore’s  charge,  the 
experience has demonstrated that it is overly simplistic to imagine that ethnic commonality will bring 
political leverage, and with it, economic advantage. The practical lesson in strategic management may 
well be the need to look beyond the official commitment, and recognize the importance of developing the 
right chemistry and a `common agenda’ with local administrators.  
 
                                                            
18 CS-SIP’s government connections have tilted the scale for the large companies. Korea’s Samsung, for example, 
had considered Wuxi, which has the most developed semi-conductor industry in China, but opted for CS-SIP as 
“Wuxi was not backed as strongly by the two governments” (cited in Law, 1996).  
19 The transfer of shareholding and management control would, according SCI officials, result in better 
“alignment of interests and improve the operating efficiency of the park” (The Straits Times, May 14, 
2002).   16 
VIETNAM-SINGAPORE INDUSTRIAL PARK 
 
The 1000-hectare Park, located 17 km north of Ho Chi Minh city, is Singapore’s flagship investment 
project in Vietnam. It was jointly proposed in 1994 by the then Vietnamese Prime Minister, Vo Van Kiet, 
and Singapore’s Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong. VSIP is developed and managed by the Singapore 
consortium led by SembCorp Industries20 (51%), and Becamex, a state-owned enterprise of the Binh 
Duong  Province  People's  Committee  (BDPPC).  In  VSIP,  Singapore  applied lessons  learned from  its 
China experience, and made deliberate efforts to foster strong collaboration with local authorities. A 
Management Board21 was set up, chaired by the Vice Chairman of BDPPC, which also pre-empted the 
perception that VSIP was a partnership forced upon by the central government. VSIP follows the BIP-
prototype. Labor is largely provided by the S$9.5 million Vietnam-Singapore Technical Training Centre 
(VSTTC)  established  in  1998.  VSTTC  is  a  three-way  project  between  the  Singapore  and  Vietnam 
governments and VSIP. 
 
Even before the launch of VSIP in May 1995, a total of 13 international companies with investments 
worth US$80 million reportedly indicated their interest in the Park (Asian Review, 1996). EDB’s role was 
acknowledged, and despite the difficult environment post-1997, cumulative investments topped US$400 
million from 33 companies in 1999.  To-date, it has attracted over US$500 million investments from 64 
tenants. Most of the tenants are from Singapore, Japan and Taiwan, reflecting the importance of Asian 
investors in the Park’s tenant mix. VSIP has a list of `priority’ industries, which adheres closely to the 
                                                            
20 Other members of the consortium include Temasek Holdings, JTC International, UOL Overseas Investments, 
Salim’s KMP Group, LKN Construction, and MC Development Asia. 
 
21  The  Board,  with  representatives  from  the  ministries  of  Trade,  Finance  and  Interior, as  well  as  the  General 
Customs Department oversees the issue of investment licenses, import/export permits, and construction permits.    17 
official list of preferred industries22 but, given the economic realities, the statistics (Table 1) suggest that 
VSIP does not target specific industries.  
 
The tightening market conditions have amplified competition from neighboring parks who offer highly 
competitive rates, some of which are run by experienced and street-savvy developers form Japan, Taiwan 
and Korea. Improvements on infrastructure have also padded the tenants’ bill.  Tensions have arisen from 
Singapore’s  perceived  ‘control’  and  management  of  the  park  despite  keen  interest  in  welcoming 
Singapore investments and transfer of technology and skills. Anecdotal evidence23 suggests that local 
sentiments towards the Singapore partners are not unlike that expressed in China, albeit to a different 




Although precise objectives for the regionalization program are not released, it is clear that the starting 
ambition was large. Industrial estates were started in China, India, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and 
Vietnam with projects identified in Cambodia and Burma (Tan, 1995; Kwok, 1996). In 1995, it was 
announced  that  up  to  30  percent  of  Singapore's  reserves  would  be  gradually  invested  in  regional 
economies  to  build  up  the  city-state’s  external  economy  (SEDB,  1995a:3),  and  to  participate  in  the 
region’s growth.  The statistics indicate the city-state has demonstrated the capacity to mobilise economic 
and political resources. Nonetheless, as openly admitted, substantial challenges remain for Singapore to 
retain majority-ownership, and management control, of the flagship projects. 
In the case of Indonesia, the raison d’etre for the projects seems to have overestimated the attractiveness 
of  low  cost  production  environments  for  multinational  companies  (Yeoh  et  al.,  2000).  BIP  has 
                                                            
22 Details are given in Circular No. 8, List of Encouraged, Limited and Prohibited Industries in Export Processing Zones and 
High-Technology Industrial Zones, issued on July 29, 1997. 
 
23 On-site interviews with VSIP executives and tenants were conducted in August 2002.   18 
increasingly  become  a  Japanese  investment  enclave,  while  BIE  has  struggled  to  gain  investment 
momentum.  The  Vietnamese  experience  is  increasingly  similar  to  the  BIP  experience,  where  the 
economics  of  competition  have  called  into  question  the  premium  attached  to  Singapore’s  industrial-
investment enclaves.  Issues pertaining to ownership-control have also surfaced in VSIP.  As for China, 
the projects were expected to benefit from the ability of Singapore’s Chinese elites to obtain a special 
status through their ethnic allegiance and dual connections to overseas Chinese and western business 
networks (Asian Review, 1996; Yeung, 1997). The Suzhou-Wuxi experience suggests that, while there is 
an interest in learning from Singapore, local officials wish to deal directly with foreign investors. This 
outcome accords with the assessment of observers that China tends increasingly not to view overseas 
Chinese as preferred investors, or joint venture partners (Harding, 1995).  
 
For the projects in Indonesia and China, but less obvious in Vietnam, the reliance on the Salim Group has 
been necessary in the context of the Indonesian system of ‘crony capitalism’ fostered by then President 
Soeharto. The end of the Soeharto era, and pressure from the IMF and western governments for financial 
transparency, has diminished Salim’s political and commercial influence (The Straits Times, April 28, 
2001).  A  longer-term  uncertainty  remains,  associated  with  the  perceived  weaknesses  in  the  political 
leadership, the challenges in the administrative and regulatory environment, and the continued resentment 
of Chinese-owned businesses amongst segments of Indonesian pribumi community (Godement, 1998). 
The  limits  of  ethnic  affiliation  for  economic  integration  have  been  exposed  in  the  China  projects. 
Singapore’s claims of a special ability to build connections with mainland China have overlooked the 
multiple competing groups within a common ethnic group.  In the Suzhou-Wuxi experiment, the limits of 
relying on personal ties have been most immediately encountered, where inter-governmental endorsement 
at the top has proved most insufficient to secure equal commitment in the lower tiers of the government. 
The claims that Singapore’s politicians have achieved a special ‘guanxi’ (relationship) with China appear 
misplaced. The cultural divide was nonchalantly pointed out by Chen Deming, Suzhou’s mayor:    19 
“In our cooperation in the past five years, that we have an MOU to solve 
our problems is because of the cultural differences in the two countries, 
and the different understanding of the items in the documents …” 
                  - quoted in The Straits Times, June 30, 1999. 
 
In summary, Singapore’s overseas parks tend to exist as investment enclaves linked to transnational 
investment networks, business elites and specific government commitments. The positive aspect of this is 
that the parks can be sites of investment privilege, in respect of their infrastructure quality and status with 
public and private agencies. The weakness is that the privileges obtained are vulnerable to changes in 
political allegiances, and the infrastructure efficiency is at risk from the uncontrolled broader environment 
in which the parks are located. The Singapore experience in Indonesia, China and Vietnam illustrates this.  
 
An outright judgement of failure or success may not be appropriate, given the mixed economic and 
political  objectives  of  Singapore’s  regionalization  strategy.  The  city-state’s  expertise  in  industrial-
township development, and its reputation for transparency and efficiency, is not in question. Development 
assumptions were, however, misplaced and socio-political priorities misaligned. All the same, official 
commitment  to  the  projects  remains24,  as  is  the  willingness  of  Singapore’s  planners  to  search  for 
alternative strategies and programs to re-position the regionalization efforts (Singapore Ministry of Trade 
& Industry, forthcoming). Perhaps, in the re-thinking, the limits of state-directed competitive advantages 
will be acknowledged. 
 
 
                                                            
24  Source:  Straits  Times,  July  2,  1999.  Singapore’s  International  Advisory  Council  has  endorsed  this  policy 
directive, and negotiations are at an advanced stage to develop Singapore-styled industrial parks in Shanghai and 
Beijing.   20 
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